{"id":28,"date":"2023-09-12T17:08:54","date_gmt":"2023-09-12T21:08:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.usnh.edu\/qyu\/?page_id=28"},"modified":"2024-01-19T12:01:49","modified_gmt":"2024-01-19T17:01:49","slug":"research","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.usnh.edu\/qyu\/research\/","title":{"rendered":"Research"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\tLoRaWAN SECURITY FOR ADVANCED MANUFACTURING<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Advanced manufacturing is transitioning into automated production, which enables the remote system monitoring, increases the online system configuration, and thus reduces the overall cost on workforce.\u00a0However, the remote access to production plants makes advanced manufacturing vulnerable to various security attacks from physical devices to cyber space.\u00a0 It is imperative to perform holistic assessment on the emerging security vulnerabilities in advanced manufacturing network.\u00a0As the long-range wide-area network (LoRaWAN) is commonly applied in advanced manufacturing sites, we examine the security weaknesses in commercial LoRa nodes, gateways, and LoRaWAN connection in this project.\u00a0\u00a0Jamming attack, replay attack, and man-in-the-middle attack from physical and cyber access will be analyzed.\u00a0 This project will disclose the security vulnerabilities in LoRaWAN and\u00a0has great potential to facilitate the development of effective defense methods for advanced manufacturing industries.\nSECURE APPROXIMATE COMPUTING SYSTEMS<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Approximate Computing (AC) techniques trade accuracy for performance improvement and energy efficiency, being increasingly attractive in various computation-intensive applications such as imaging processing, audio recognition, information search, and artificial intelligence. However, recent literature indicates that the utilization of AC techniques may raise new and unique security concerns. This project investigates hardware (HW) and software (SW) integrated methods to secure AC systems.\nHARDWARE DESIGN OBFUSCATION<\/a>
\n<\/strong>The untrusted parties in the global supply chain may tamper with the original design and\/or introduce malicious components known as hardware Trojans. As the measurable changes (e.g., delay, power, area, and temperature) introduced by hardware Trojans become relatively small compared with the overall system-under-attack characteristics, side-channel analysis based Trojan detection lose their efficacy.\u00a0Moreover, the lack of a golden reference model makes Trojan detection difficult. To tackle these emerging challenges, we propose to obfuscate the hardware design at multiple abstraction levels.\nCOMBINED SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS AND FAULT ATTACKS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEVICES<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Countermeasures for cryptographic devices to thwart side-channel analysis attack and fault attack are typically investigated in a separate fashion. There\u00a0lacks\u00a0thorough investigation on how one countermeasure specifically for one attack affects the efficiency of another attack. We are developing a unified countermeasure to address the combined attack. Our research team explores a unified framework to tackle both attacks effecitvely.\nTRUSTWORTHY 3D INTEGRATED CIRCUITS<\/a>
\n<\/strong>New hardware security threats occur in emerging three-dimensional (3D) integrated circuits (ICs). It is imperative to study the potential countermeasures for 3D ICs.\n